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INTRODUCTION
Unanimity is often difficult to achieve, even on the most insignificant issues.1 As a result, in American law and politics unanimous
agreement is rarely required; instead, majority or super-majority
consensus is the norm.2 In federal civil procedure, however,
unanimity is required for defendants attempting to remove their
lawsuits from state court to federal court.3 Although this unanimity
requirement is not in doubt, as courts have enforced it without
exception for over a century,4 uncertainty regarding the removal
procedure lingers. Specifically, U.S. federal courts continue to
disagree about how defendants must express their consent to the
removal.5 Given the considerable impact a successful—or unsuccessful—removal procedure can have on the final outcome of a
lawsuit,6 this judicial vacillation places litigants in a procedural
quandary, leaving both plaintiffs and defendants unsure of what
exactly is required to remove a case.7
There are two competing approaches to the practical application
of the unanimity rule in a removal proceeding, and whenever a
1. See A. Georges L. Romme, Unanimity Rule and Organizational Decision Making: A
Simulation Model, 15 ORG . SCI. 704, 705 (2004) (“[M]any authors assume the attainment of
unanimity is infeasible or impossible, particularly in large groups.”). However, this difficulty
may subside as the number of decision makers decreases.
2. E.g., U.S. CONST . amend. XII (noting that the President must receive a majority of
electoral votes); N.Y. BUS . CORP . § 708(d) (Consol. 1983) (requiring a majority vote by quorum
of directors for board action); Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999) (finding
that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury to convict in a federal criminal trial).
3. See Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1900) (stating
that because the removal statute “is confined to the defendant or defendants, it was well
settled that a removal could not be effected unless all the parties on the same side of the
controversy united in the petition”).
4. See id.; Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 335, 337 (1900);
Charles Clark & James William Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure I: The Background,
44 YALE L.J. 387, 411 n.113 (1935) (discussing the history of removal statutes).
5. See infra Part II.
6. One study found that plaintiffs won 71 percent of diversity cases initially filed in
federal court, but plaintiffs won only 34 percent of removed diversity cases. Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal
System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV . 581, 581 (1998).
7. More than 30,000 cases are removed annually. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL .,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 n.119 (2009).
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plaintiff challenges removal on this procedural ground, the court
must decide which interpretation is appropriate. Numerous federal
courts require all defendants to individually express their consent
to removing the case,8 whereas many other federal courts permit
one defendant to pledge in the notice of removal that all the other
defendants have consented to the action.9 These different approaches to the unanimity requirement exist in large part because
the rule is judicially created and, consequently, the courts lack any
clear statutory guidance.10 As such, the exact details of the rule
have been left to individual federal courts to develop and apply.
This Note investigates the current judicial disagreement
regarding the unanimous consent requirement and ultimately
argues that, based on several considerations, the best approach for
federal courts to apply is the individual consent rule: this standard
prohibits an attorney from vouching for the consent of the other
defendants and instead requires each defendant to submit his own,
written consent to the court. In reaching this conclusion, Part I
discusses the history and fundamentals of the removal procedure.
Part II then explores and analyzes the most pertinent and illustrative cases regarding each interpretation of the unanimity rule.
These cases demonstrate the current judicial split, the judicial
considerations behind each interpretation of the unanimity rule,
and how an improper removal can significantly affect the final
outcome of a case. Next, Part III explores the policy rationales
behind removal jurisdiction. This discussion is essential to resolving
the current judicial split because any interpretation of the unanimity rule must be consistent with the general policy aspirations of
removal jurisdiction.
Finally, Part IV offers several arguments for and against each
interpretation of the unanimity rule, including the proper application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 within the removal
statutes, the importance of having clear procedural rules, and the
need for courts to strictly construe all aspects of the removal
process. In the end, this Note concludes that the independent-andunambiguous consent rule is much more than a vexatious require8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See Spillers v. Tillman, 959 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D. Miss. 1997).

2011]

ON REM OVAL JURISDICTION

239

ment that courts impose on defendants. Instead, the rule is superior
because it reflects an accurate interpretation of the removal
statutes, protects a defendant’s right to due process, promotes
certainty and reduces superfluous litigation, and furthers the
numerous policy goals of the unanimity rule and of removal
jurisdiction in general.
I. THE FUNDAM ENTALS OF REM OVAL JURISDICTION
Removal is the process by which defendants in a civil case may
move to federal court an action that a plaintiff originally filed in
state court. Although removal jurisdiction is not grounded in the
Constitution, it has existed in American jurisprudence for more
than two centuries.11 That removal is constitutional and within
Congress’s power to implement is a settled question in American
law,12 and today the procedure operates as one of three ways a
party may invoke federal jurisdiction—along with filing directly in
federal court or seeking the review of a state court decision in
federal court.13
In many lawsuits, the state and federal courts share jurisdiction,
giving plaintiffs the decision of whether to proceed initially in either
judicial system.14 In these situations of concurrent jurisdiction, the
plaintiff and defendant each have an opportunity to avoid state
court—the plaintiff by initially filing in federal court and the
defendant by removing the action to federal court after the plaintiff
files in state court. Thus, assuming federal jurisdiction exists, the
state court will hear the case only when both parties agree that
state court is the best forum for the dispute.15 Within this jurisdictional tug of war, removal provides defendants with the rare
11. See Tristin K. Green, Comment, Complete Preemption—Removing the Mystery from
Removal, 86 CALIF . L. REV . 363, 364 (1998); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., CIVIL
PROCEDURE 56 (3d ed. 1999).
12. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 265 (1879); Ry. Co. v. Whitton’s Adm’r, 80 U.S.
270, 289-90 (1871); Edward Hartnett, A New Trick from an Old and Abused Dog: Section
1441(c) Lives and Now Permits the Remand of Federal Question Cases, 63 FORDHAM L. REV .
1099, 1108 n.41 (1995).
13. JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL ., MOORE ’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.03 (3d ed. 2011).
14. See ROBERT CLINTON ET AL ., FEDERAL COURTS : THEORY AND PRACTICE 585 (1996).
15. Id. at 588.
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opportunity to alter the forum.16 Nevertheless, the plaintiff, as
master of the complaint, still retains significant control over the
forum in which the lawsuit will be litigated17 and has numerous
tools at his disposal to foil a defendant’s ability to remove the case.18
Although simple in theory, removal is a complicated legal procedure with many moving parts.19 As one federal judge asserted
nearly a century ago, “[t]hat there is no other phase of American
jurisprudence with so many refinements and subtleties, as relate to
removal proceedings, is known by all who have to deal with them.”20
Another commentator described the law regarding removal jurisdiction as “a snare and a delusion.”21 Regardless of the difficulties
surrounding the removal process, it remains an important and
dependable arrow in the American litigator’s quiver, as evidenced
by the fact that as many as 11 percent of the cases in federal court
during a given year entered that forum through removal.22
A. A Brief History
The scope and application of removal jurisdiction has evolved
over the past several centuries. At English common law, no removal
procedure existed.23 In the United States, the Judiciary Act of 1789
first enumerated the right to removal, but this law limited removal

16. See James T. Fousekis & James F. Brelsford, Removal, LITIGATION , Summer 1985,
at 39; see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 56.
17. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 58.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006) (stating the forum-defendant rule, which prohibits
removal premised on diversity jurisdiction when any defendant is a citizen of the state in
which the suit is filed); Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs’ Attempts
to Destroy Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM . U. L. REV . 49, 53-64 (2009); Victor E.
Schwartz et al., Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal
Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV . J. ON LEGIS . 483, 485-86 (2000).
19. See Hartnett, supra note 12, at 1107.
20. Hagerla v. Miss. River Power Co., 202 F. 771, 773 (S.D. Iowa 1912); see also Harper
v. Sonnabend, 182 F. Supp. 594, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“[Removal] luxuriates in a riotous
uncertainty.”).
21. JAMES HAMILTON LEWIS , REMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURTS 8
(1923).
22. See MOORE ET AL ., supra note 13, § 107.03; Yosef Rothstein, Ask Not for Whom the
Bell Tolls: How Federal Courts Have Ignored the Knock on the Forum Selection Door Since
Congress Amended Section 1446(b), 33 COLUM . J.L. & SOC . PROBS . 181, 185 (2000).
23. See WRIGHT ET AL ., supra note 7, § 3721.
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to diversity jurisdiction actions only.24 The 1789 Act, moreover,
permitted removal by “aliens, nonresident defendants, and parties
to suits concerning land titles in which one party relied on a [title
granted in a nonforum state] and an adverse party relied on a grant
from the state in which the suit was brought.”25 Nearly a century
later, the Judiciary Act of 1875 significantly expanded the ability of
litigators to remove an action by allowing the removal of nearly
every lawsuit over which there was federal jurisdiction and, for the
first time, by granting “either party” to the suit—that is, either the
plaintiff or the defendant—the opportunity to remove.26 At all other
times since the adoption of the 1789 Judiciary Act, the right of
removal had been limited to only defendants.27
Twelve years after the 1875 Judiciary Act, Congress enacted the
Judiciary and Removal Act of 1887. The 1887 Act provided the
modern foundation for removal jurisdiction by restricting the
removal power to only defendants and by prohibiting removal when
the defendant’s pleadings were the exclusive basis for federal
jurisdiction.28 It stated:
[A]ny suit of a civil nature ... of which the circuit courts of the
United States are given original jurisdiction ... which may now
be pending, or which may hereafter be brought, in any State
court, may be removed by the defendant or defendants therein
to the circuit court of the United States for the proper district.29

Today, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, one of several modern removal statutes, is
based on the 1887 Act30 and similarly specifies that only defendants
have the statutory right to remove “any civil action brought in a
State court of which the district courts of the United States have

24. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80; see also Shamrock Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1941); Hartnett, supra note 12, at 1114.
25. WRIGHT ET AL ., supra note 7, § 3721.
26. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71 (1875); see also Shamrock Oil
& Gas Corp., 313 U.S. at 104-05; WRIGHT ET AL ., supra note 7, § 3721.
27. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp., 313 U.S. at 105; see also H.R. REP . NO . 1078-49, at 1
(1886).
28. WRIGHT ET AL ., supra note 7, § 3721.
29. Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (1887).
30. See Green, supra note 11, at 365.
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original jurisdiction.”31 Specifically, removal may be based on
diversity jurisdiction,32 federal question jurisdiction,33 or on one of
several statutory grounds.34
B. The Removal Procedure
1. Basic Principles of Removal
Although commentators have described removal as a “peculiar
procedure” and a “judicial curiosity,” there are several consistent
features within the process.35 First, § 1441 allows a case to be removed only from a state court to a federal court.36 There is no
procedure for moving a case from federal court to state court or
from one state court to another state court.37 Second, § 1441 applies
to only civil actions, not criminal proceedings in state courts.38
Third, as § 1441(a) notes, only “the defendant or the defendants”
may remove a case.39 A plaintiff may not remove a case,40 even
when the plaintiff becomes a defendant due to a counterclaim.41
Third-party defendants are also not entitled to remove a case in the
absence of specific statutory authority.42 It may be obvious, then,
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).
32. U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
33. U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
34. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442-44, 1452(a).
35. MOORE ET AL ., supra note 13, § 107.03.
36. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 57 (quoting Tinney v. McClain, 76 F. Supp.
694, 698 (N.D. Tex. 1948)).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 57 & n.6.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 57.
40. See Am. Int’l Underwriters (Phil.), Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1260 (9th
Cir. 1988).
41. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104-07 (1941); CLINTON ET AL .,
supra note 14, at 593-99. See generally Haden P. Gerrish, Note, Third-Party Removal Under
Section 1441(c), 52 FORDHAM L. REV . 133 (1983).
42. Federal courts have consistently ruled that third-party defendants are not
“defendants” within the meaning of § 1441(a). See First Nat’l Bank of Pulaski v. Curry, 301
F.3d 456, 461-62 (6th Cir. 2002); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 2d 357, 373-74
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). This restriction also applies to parties joined as counterclaim defendants.
See Capitalsource Fin., L.L.C. v. THI of Columbus, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (S.D. Ohio
2005). However, courts have upheld removal by third-party defendants when there is explicit
statutory authorization to do so. See Ciolino v. Ryan, No. C03-1396, 2003 WL 21556959, at
*3 n.4 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2003); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 61 n.36.
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that nonparties to a lawsuit are also not entitled to remove a case
because, in § 1441(a), “defendant” refers exclusively to a party
brought into a suit through adequate service of process.43 Finally,
a case may be removed only to the federal district court that
“embrac[es]” the state court from which the action is being removed.44 In addition to these basic principles, there are numerous
other procedural rules that a defendant must follow in order to
successfully remove a case.45
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Timing Rules, and the Filing
Process
As noted above, a defendant may remove a lawsuit only when he
could have originally filed it in a federal district court.46 To make
that determination, the jurisdiction issue is analyzed just as it
would have been had the case originally been filed in federal court.47
If the action is being removed based on diversity jurisdiction, a
court determines diversity of citizenship at the commencement of
the action and at the time of removal,48 and the constitutional
requirements of Article III, Section 2, and the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, including the amount-in-controversy
requirement, are in full effect.49 If, on the other hand, federal question jurisdiction is the foundation for removal, the well-pleaded
complaint rule still applies, along with the other requirements of
Article III, Section 2, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.50

43. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 57; see also Hous. Auth. of Atlanta v. Millwood,
472 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1973).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). After a case is properly removed, it may be transferred to
another federal district court. Id. §§ 1404, 1406(a).
45. E.g., id. § 1446(b) (timing requirements); id. § 1446(d) (filing requirements).
46. Id. § 1441(a).
47. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 58.
48. See Stevens v. Nichols, 130 U.S. 230, 231 (1889); Lombardi v. Paige, No. 00 CV 2605
RCC, 2001 WL 303831, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2001); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11,
at 60.
49. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 58. If a case is removed pursuant to § 1332,
the forum-defendant rule also applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).
50. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 58; see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986); Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search
of Definition, 76 TEX . L. REV . 1781, 1783 (1998).
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28 U.S.C. § 1446 sets out the timing requirements for removal.
A defendant seeking removal must file a notice of removal within
thirty days of receiving service of process.51 If the case is not
removable at the time of service, the defendant must file for removal within thirty days of when “it may first be ascertained that
the case is one which is or has become removable.”52 But, if the case
later becomes removable because of diversity jurisdiction, it cannot
be removed more than one year from the commencement of the
action.53
The federal courts currently disagree, however, about the application of these timing rules when multiple defendants are served at
different times.54 This discord has led to three divergent approaches, each of which receives approval from numerous federal
jurisdictions: (1) the thirty-day time frame to remove begins as soon
as the first defendant is served, and if no defendant removes the
case during that window, later-served defendants cannot remove
the case;55 (2) the thirty-day time frame to remove does not begin
until the last defendant is served;56 and (3) the McKinney rule,
which gives the first-served defendant thirty days to file for removal

51. See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 346 (1999); Jay P.
Lechner, Recent Trends in the Eleventh Circuit: Removal Jurisdiction and Procedures in
Employment Law Litigation, 28 NOVA L. REV . 351, 373 (2004).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
53. Id.
54. See Lechner, supra note 51, at 374; see also Rothstein, supra note 22, at 210-13;
Lindsay E. Hale, Comment, Triggering Removal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446: The Eleventh
Circuit’s Adoption of the Last-Served Defendant Rule in Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica,
Inc., 32 AM . J. TRIAL ADVOC . 363, 369-81 (2008); Briant S. Platt, Note, Section 1446(b)
Federal Removal Jurisdiction and the Thirty-Day Clock: Should a Motion to Amend Trigger
the Time Bomb?, 4 NEV . L.J. 120, 126-35 (2003).
55. See Betts v. Larsen Intermodal Servs., Inc., No. 05-0600-CG-C, 2006 WL 1748600, at
*4 (S.D. Ala. June 21, 2006); Smith v. Health Ctr. of Lake City, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1336,
1345-46 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
56. See Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 1999);
Piacente v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Buffalo, 362 F. Supp. 2d 383, 387 (W.D.N.Y. 2004). In 2009,
H.R. 4113 was introduced in the House of Representatives to codify the later-served
defendant rule within § 1446(b); the bill is currently before the House Subcommittee on
Courts and Competition Policy and the Senate Judiciary Committee. H.R. 4113, 111th Cong.
§ 103 (2010); Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010), H.R.
4113, Committees, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04113:@@@c (last visited
Sept. 25, 2011).
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and also gives each later-served defendant thirty days from when
he is served to join the removal notice.57
If the removing defendant meets the previously mentioned
requirements for removal, § 1446(d) enumerates exactly how he
must proceed.58 After the defendant files the notice of removal, he
must promptly give written notice to all adverse parties and file a
copy of the notice of removal with the clerk of the state court from
which the defendant is removing the case.59 After receiving a copy
of the notice, the state court must immediately stop all proceedings
on the case because, regardless of the removal’s propriety, the state
court’s subsequent actions would be invalid.60 A defendant may
waive the opportunity to remove the case, however, by defending
against the lawsuit in state court before filing for removal.61
3. Remand
A plaintiff may challenge the propriety of the removal by filing a
motion to remand pursuant to § 1447(c).62 The defendant then bears
the burden of proving that the removal was proper.63 Motions to
remand that are premised on procedural defects in the removal
must be filed within thirty days after the defendant filed the notice
of removal;64 a motion to remand based on a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction may be filed at any time.65 The federal district court
must also remand the case sua sponte if it discovers a jurisdictional
57. See McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of Marland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992);
Jonathan K. Youngblood, An Overview of Removing and Remanding Cases Originally Filed
in State Courts, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION 2007: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND BEST
PRACTICES IN “HIGH -STAKES ” CASES 31, 47-49 (2007) (citing cases).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2006).
59. Id.
60. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 64; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). If the case is
remanded, the state court may restart the proceedings. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note
11, at 64.
61. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 64 & n.53.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
63. R. G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir. 1979);
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 64.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
65. Id. For more on the classification of procedural and jurisdiction defects, see Scott
Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 N.W. U. L. REV . 55, 55-79 (2008); see also
Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN . L. REV . 1457, 1470-80
(2006).
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defect in the removal.66 A plaintiff waives the opportunity to
remand the case if, once the removed case begins proceeding on its
merits, he fails to timely object to the removal.67
II. THE UNANIM ITY RULE : A CIRCUIT SPLIT
The final procedural hurdle for defendants attempting to remove
a case to federal court is that every served defendant must consent
to the removal.68 Consequently, each defendant must both agree to
the removal and express that agreement.69 This “unanimity rule” is
a procedural requirement, the violation of which may result in the
case being remanded to state court if the plaintiff brings the error
to the attention of the court within thirty days of the removal.70
Although the unanimity requirement is judicially created and not
specifically enumerated by any statute or procedural rule,71 federal
courts have consistently and steadfastly applied it.72
The unanimity rule protects plaintiffs from litigating cases in
separate forums, which would occur if one defendant was able to
remove the claim against himself while other defendants allowed
their suits to remain in state court. As one federal district court has
described it, “[o]ne of the purposes of this ‘rule of unanimity’ is to
prevent the defendants from gaining an unfair tactical advantage
by splitting the litigation and requiring the plaintiff to pursue the
case in two fora simultaneously, thereby creating needless duplication of effort and additional expense.”73 The rule also promotes

66. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
67. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL ., supra note 11, at 64. Jurisdictional defects in the removal are
never waivable. Id.
68. Balazik v. Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 1995).
69. See id.
70. See id.; see also Johnson v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 892 F.2d 422, 423 (5th Cir.
1990).
71. See Spillers v. Tillman, 959 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D. Miss. 1997). The pending bill that
would codify the later-served defendant rule within § 1446(b) would also institute the
unanimity rule. See H.R. 4113, 111th Cong. § 103 (2010). But, if passed as currently drafted,
the amendment would not resolve how defendants must actually show consent. H.R. 4113,
111th Cong. § 103 (2010).
72. See Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1900); see also
Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 393 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Removal
requires the consent of all of the defendants.”).
73. Sansone v. Morton Mach. Works, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 (D.R.I. 2002).
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consistent state and federal court rulings and protects defendants
desiring to stay in state court by not allowing one defendant to force
other unwilling defendants into the federal forum.74
Although there is no reason to doubt the future of the unanimity
rule itself, federal courts are divided regarding the functional
application of the rule in multi-defendant lawsuits. Some federal
courts require each defendant to submit his own consent form,75
whereas other federal courts allow one defendant to pledge in the
notice of removal that all the other defendants have consented.76
This Part discusses the most prominent federal cases that illustrate
this judicial discord and the rationales that courts on each side of
the divide have applied.
A. The Vouching Rule
Several federal courts have adopted a rule that allows one
defendant, in the notice of removal, to vouch for the consent of the
other defendants. For example, in Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology,
Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a timely notice
of removal filed by one defendant containing an averment of the
other, nonmoving defendant’s consent was sufficient to satisfy the
unanimity rule’s consent requirement.77 Similarly, in Harper v.
AutoAlliance International, Inc., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that only one attorney of record must sign the notice of
removal so long as that attorney certifies that the remaining
defendants have consented.78 Some courts have gone so far as to
declare that it is sufficient for one defendant to orally express
consent to the moving defendant as long as that moving defendant
files the notice of removal on time.79
74. Id.
75. See infra Part II.B.
76. See infra Part II.A.
77. 584 F.3d 1208, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2009).
78. 392 F.3d 195, 201-02 (6th Cir. 2004).
79. See, e.g., Clyde v. Nat’l Data Corp., 609 F. Supp. 216, 218 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (“[The
unanimity] rule does not require that every defendant actually sign the same petition....
However, the cases indicate that such unanimity must be expressed to the court within the
thirty day period, whether by petition, written consent or oral consent.”); Colin K. v. Schmidt,
528 F. Supp. 355, 358 (D.R.I. 1981) (concluding that defendant’s oral consent to removal is
sufficient).
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1. Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.
In Proctor, minority shareholders brought an action against the
defendant corporation, its shareholders, and Ernst & Young, LLP,
for breach of fiduciary duty and waste of corporate assets.80 After
the defendants removed the action to federal court, the plaintiffs
filed a motion to remand, which the federal district court denied.81
The court then granted the defendants summary judgment, and the
minority shareholders appealed.82 Of particular importance was the
plaintiffs’ motion to remand, which was premised on procedural
defects in the removal notice.83
The plaintiffs argued that the notice of removal was improper
because a defendant did not provide a timely, written expression of
his consent to the removal petition that Ernst & Young filed.84
Ernst & Young’s notice of removal stated that all defendants had
consented to the removal of the action, but one defendant did not
file his own written notice of removal until well after the thirty-day
removal time frame expired.85 As an issue of first impression for the
Ninth Circuit, the court chose to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s rule that
consent is properly expressed when an attorney of record signs the
notice and states that the remaining defendants consent to the
removal, rather than requiring each defendant to individually
submit written notice of his consent.86
To determine which rule to apply, the Proctor court considered
the relevant modern removal statute87 and the seminal Supreme
Court case on the unanimity rule, Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific
Railway Co. v. Martin.88 Noting that Martin described the unanimity rule but did not define how defendants must express their
consent to removal, and without any federal statute to provide
80. Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1213.
81. Id. at 1213, 1218.
82. Id. at 1218.
83. Id. at 1219.
84. Id. at 1224.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1225.
88. 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900) (“It was well settled [under the Judiciary Act of 1875] that
a removal could not be effected unless all the parties on the same side of the controversy
united in the petition.”).
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guidance, the Ninth Circuit court looked to the principles of the
removal process and the rules for attorney representations to the
court for direction.89 In particular, the court cited § 1446(a), which
requires defendants to sign the notice of removal “pursuant to Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”90 Rule 11, the court
noted, requires that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other
paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record.”91 The court
continued, stating that Rule 11 also prescribes that “[b]y presenting
to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney ...
certifies that ... the factual contentions [therein] have evidentiary
support.”92
The court acknowledged two concerns that arise when one defendant is permitted to vouch for another defendant’s consent: the
fear of a defendant erroneously stating the other defendant’s
consent, and the concern that a nonmoving defendant might tacitly
allow the removal only to later object to it by claiming nonconsent
after determining that the new federal forum is unfavorable.93
Ultimately, however, the court held that Ernst & Young’s notice of
removal, although unsigned by another defendant, was sufficient
because of two mitigating factors that alleviated the above concerns:
the moving party was bound by the threat of sanctions pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and the nonmoving codefendant
knew of the removal petition and thus had an adequate opportunity
to object to it.94
2. Harper v. AutoAlliance International, Inc.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Harper, which, as noted, was
persuasive in the Proctor holding, reached the same result by
applying a comparable analysis.95 In Harper, the plaintiff filed a
retaliatory discharge claim against several defendants.96 The
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 11(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 11(b)).
Id.
Id.
392 F.3d 195, 201-02 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 198-99.
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defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan, which denied the plaintiff ’s
motion to remand.97 The court subsequently granted summary
judgment for the defendants.98 The plaintiff appealed the district
court’s rejection of his motion to remand, claiming that not every
defendant consented to the notice of removal.99
The attorneys for three of the four defendants had signed the
notice of removal.100 The notice stated that the three signing attorneys had “obtained concurrence from counsel” for the fourth
defendant, Jeffrey Kelly.101 The plaintiff contended that pursuant
to § 1446(a), each defendant must sign the notice of removal because Rule 11 does not allow one defendant to make representations or file pleadings on behalf of his codefendants.102 The Harper
court, however, rejected this interpretation of Rule 11 and instead
held that nothing in the rule prohibited an attorney from making
a representation regarding a nonmoving codefendant’s consent.103
If the three signers had fraudulently vouched for Kelly’s consent,
the court noted, it could have remanded the case due to the procedural defect and issued sanctions.104
3. Roybal v. City of Albuquerque
An interesting disagreement has also developed within the Tenth
Circuit regarding the consent requirement. In 2008, the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico ruled that each
party to a lawsuit must individually express consent.105 But, that
same year, the court chose not to apply that ruling in a subsequent
case and instead allowed one defendant to express consent for

Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 201-02.
Id. at 202; see also GREGORY P. JOSEPH , SANCTIONS : THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION
ABUSE § 5(A)(2)(b) (4th ed. 2008) (discussing Rule 11 sanctions for filing a removal petition
in bad faith).
105. Vasquez v. Americano U.S.A., L.L.C., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1257 (D.N.M. 2008).
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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another defendant.106 In Roybal v. City of Albuquerque, the New
Mexico district court enumerated four reasons for not requiring
each defendant to individually express consent.107 First, § 1446(a)
does not explicitly state that separate consent is required.108
Second, federal courts regularly rely on the representations of an
attorney about another party.109 Third, although courts should
strictly construe the removal statutes, and despite the presumption
against removal, courts should not make rules that are unnecessary
for enforcing the removal statutes and that are contrary to ordinary federal procedural practices.110 Finally, the court stated that
without case law illustrating a problem with defendants misrepresenting each other’s consent, the individual written consent requirement is an unnecessary and “drastic measure.”111
Overall, when adopting the vouching rule, courts rely heavily on
their statutory interpretation of § 1446(a) and the regulatory power
of Rule 11. Moreover, courts criticize the alternative individual
written consent requirement as being overly burdensome and
formalistic.112 The less stringent vouching rule presumably boasts
efficiency and temporal benefits in the litigation process when compared to the perceived burden that requiring individual written
consent imposes.113 By relaxing requirements for removal, courts
grant defendants greater access to the federal courts, whereas a
more restrictive and persnickety procedural requirement might be
perceived as heightening the barrier of access to the federal judicial
system—and greater access to the federal courts is an important

106. Compare id. at 1257-58, with Tresco, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 10-0390, 2010 WL
2977606, at *10-11 (D.N.M. July 10, 2010), and Roybal v. City of Albuquerque, No. 08-181,
2008 WL 5991063, at *1 (D.N.M. Sept. 24, 2008).
107. 2008 WL 5991063, at *21-24.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Esposito v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 590 F.3d 72, 76-77 (1st Cir. 2009)
(“Although mindful of the principle that removal statutes are to be narrowly construed, we
nevertheless are not inclined to establish a wooden rule, regardless of whether such a rule
would have the benefit of promoting clarity.”); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 528 F. Supp. 355, 358
(D.R.I. 1981) (“[T]his Court does not believe that it is necessary for all defendants actually
to sign the petition. Requiring all defendants to sign would be a senseless formalism.”).
113. Courts applying the independent-and-unambiguous rule refute this claim. See infra
Part II.B.
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policy goal.114 Numerous other federal courts have reached a
different conclusion on this issue, however, by holding that one
defendant vouching for another’s consent is insufficient under the
removal statutes and the unanimity rule.
B. The Independent-and-Unambiguous Consent Rule
In contrast to the vouching approach, numerous federal appellate
and district courts have imposed a more stringent consent requirement on defendants. This interpretation of the unanimity rule—
described by some courts as the “independent-and-unambiguous
consent requirement”—requires all defendants to individually
express their own consent to the court.115 The Fifth,116 Seventh,117
and Eighth118 Circuits, as well as numerous federal district
courts,119 have adopted this approach. For example, in Getty Oil
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that pursuant to § 1446(a), one defendant could
not adequately claim in his notice of removal that another defendant “do[es] not oppose and consent[s] to [the] ... Petition for
Removal.”120 Instead, the court held that each defendant must
114. See Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are
the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA . L. REV . 1901, 1906 (1989).
115. See Henderson v. Holmes, 920 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 n.2 (D. Kan. 1996); see also Miller
v. Fed. Int’l, Inc., No. 9-CV-105-JPG, 2009 WL 535945, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2009) (“[I]t is
not enough for the removing defendants to say in their notice simply that all the other
defendants do not object to removal. All defendants must join in the motion by supporting
it in writing.”).
116. See Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 n.11 (5th Cir. 1988).
117. See Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1994) (“To ‘join’ a motion is to
support it in writing.”), abrogated on other grounds by Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 346 (1999).
118. See Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2008).
119. E.g., Boruff v. Transervice, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-00322, 2011 WL 1296675, at *2 (N.D.
Ind. Mar. 3, 2011); Nat’l Waste Assocs. v. TD Bank, N.A., No. 3:10-CV-289, 2010 WL
1931031, at *7 (D. Conn. May 12, 2010); Dichiara v. RDM Techs., No. 08-11411-NMG, 2009
WL 1351640, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 2009); Creed v. Virginia, 596 F. Supp. 2d 930, 934 (E.D.
Va. 2009); Vasquez v. Americano U.S.A., L.L.C., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1257-58 (D.N.M.
2008); Ricciardi v. Kone, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 455, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Sansone v. Morton Mach.
Works, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185 (D.R.I. 2002); Tate v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., Inc., 151
F. Supp. 2d 222, 223-24 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Berrios v. Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., No. 99 Civ.
21, 1999 WL 92269, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1999); Martin Oil Co. v. Phila. Life Ins. Co., 827
F. Supp. 1236, 1237-38 (N.D. W. Va. 1993).
120. 841 F.2d at 1262 n.11.
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individually provide timely, written consent to the removal.121 An
analysis of several cases from these jurisdictions illustrates the
courts’ reasoning for strictly enforcing the unanimity rule’s consent
requirement and why these courts reject the vouching rule as insufficient.122
1. Henderson v. Holmes
The court in Henderson v. Holmes reached a conclusion similar
to that in Getty Oil Corp.123 In Henderson, a torts case decided by
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, the
court granted the plaintiff ’s motion to remand when one of the two
defendants failed to express his consent to the removal in writing
before the removal deadline, even though the second defendant had
filed a timely notice of removal.124 In addition, the court refused to
infer the defendant’s consent from his decision to file his answer in
federal court.125
The Henderson court favored this interpretation of the unanimity
rule based on several considerations. First, without a written representation on record stating a defendant’s consent, nothing binds
that defendant as consenting to the notice of removal.126 Second,
and perhaps most importantly, the independent-and-unambiguous
consent requirement ensures that the necessary unanimity exists.127
Third, the requirement is consistent with the need to strictly construe removal rules in favor of remand and state jurisdiction.128
Fourth, the rule does not place an unfair burden on defendants and
prevents manipulation by plaintiffs.129 And finally, numerous other
federal district and circuit courts have successfully applied this specific rule.130
121. Id. The court left open the possibility for one defendant to formally grant the other
defendant the authority to act on his behalf during the removal, but that did not occur. Id.
122. Martin Oil Co., 827 F. Supp. at 1237-38.
123. 920 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (D. Kan. 1996).
124. Id. at 1185, 1187.
125. Id. at 1187. Contra Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 202 (6th Cir.
2004) (inferring consent from defendant’s answer).
126. Henderson, 920 F. Supp. at 1187 n.2.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.

254

W ILLIAM AND M ARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:235

2. Sansone v. Morton Machine Works, Inc.
In Sansone v. Morton Machine Works, Inc., a products liability
case decided in the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island, one of two defendant corporations did not file its
motion to join the removal petition of the other corporation until
forty-nine days after both defendants were served with the
complaint.131 The nonmoving defendant argued that it had verbally
consented to the removal with the other defendant and that such
consent should be sufficient.132 In rejecting this argument and
granting the plaintiff ’s motion to remand, the Sansone court
concluded that even had the moving defendant’s complaint attested
to the nonmoving defendant’s consent, that attestation would have
been insufficient pursuant to the court’s standard, which required
each defendant to individually express timely, written consent to
the removal.133
In addition to what the court described as “the overwhelming
weight of authority requiring that each defendant independently
notify the court of its consent,” the court cited several significant
policy reasons to support its decision.134 Most importantly, a brightline rule that requires all defendants to express consent eliminates
uncertainty regarding what is required for a proper removal, thus
“avoiding needless duplication of effort in two different fora.”135 The
independent consent requirement, moreover, prevents defendants
from later claiming a procedural defect in the removal after
discovering the federal forum to be unfavorable, because each
defendant’s consent is in writing.136 The inherent certainty of the
independent-and-unambiguous consent rule also conserves scarce
judicial resources by reducing litigation regarding motions to
remand: evidentiary hearings to determine whether a defendant
actually expressed consent to his codefendant are rendered
unnecessary.137 Finally, the Sansone court concluded that applying
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

188 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185 (D.R.I. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186.
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this rule was consistent with the Supreme Court’s mandate that in
order to protect state judicial power, courts must strictly construe
the removal statutes in favor of state court jurisdiction.138
III. THE POLICY OF REM OVAL JURISDICTION : WHY IT WAS CREATED
AND WHY IT IS USED
The policy rationales behind removal jurisdiction and the
unanimity rule are essential to resolving the current judicial disagreement. Courts on each side of the divide support their choice of
which rule to adopt by citing the fundamental policy justifications
for removal jurisdiction and the unanimity rule. Consequently, a
discussion of these rationales is the logical place to begin any effort
to resolve the current debate.
Removal is, at its core, an exercise in forum shopping.139 The
defendant attempts either to avoid a specific state court that is
suspected to be plaintiff-friendly or to end litigation that has begun
unfavorably in a state tribunal.140 Removal is unique, however, in
that it is the only procedure that allows an action to be automatically moved from one proper judicial system to another,141 and it is
one of the rare procedural actions in which the defendant, by filing
a notice of removal rather than a motion to remove, may act
without seeking the court’s permission.142 The general rationale for
permitting removal is to protect a defendant’s right to litigate in a
federal forum when a plaintiff files a claim in state court that could
otherwise have been brought in the federal judicial system.143
Although Congress could have expanded the defendant’s right by
allowing every claim that could have been originally brought in a
federal district court to be removed, the removal statutes are not so
far-reaching. Instead, Congress has enacted numerous limitations
138. Id.
139. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of
Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV . 1507 (1995) (discussing the pretrial forum battle).
140. AM . LAW INST ., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 358 (1969).
141. See MOORE ET AL ., supra note 13, § 107.03.
142. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two
Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV .
1217, 1245 (2008).
143. See Ehrlich v. Oxford Ins. Co., 700 F. Supp. 495, 497 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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that prevent the removal of specific types of cases that otherwise
would be removable, such as the forum-defendant rule of
§ 1441(b).144
The opportunity to have a dispute heard before a court is deeply
engrained in the American psyche, as “the public has been taught
that courts exist to provide a solution ... for life’s ills,” and citizens
use “the judicial system [to] resolve[ ] complex political and cultural
issues in our modern times.”145 Removal jurisdiction operates as one
means of accessing the federal court system in particular, and there
are numerous important policy reasons for allowing this procedural
opportunity, such as providing an impartial forum to out-of-state
defendants who are haled into a plaintiff ’s home state court.146 In
addition, defendants may seek to have the case heard in the federal
rather than state court system because they believe that litigation
in federal court is more burdensome to plaintiffs than similar
litigation in a state forum.147
Through the removal statutes, Congress also intended to ensure
that a removed lawsuit stays together as a single action by allowing
a defendant to remove a “separate and independent claim” when
appropriate.148 Consequently, removal is consistent with the
efficiency goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as outlined
in Rule 1.149 The pursuit of efficiency—which may be succinctly
defined as “achieving an objective for the lowest cost”150 —is essential to resolving the current judicial dissonance regarding the
application of the unanimity rule in multi-defendant lawsuits. This
Part discusses the numerous other historical, practical, and institutional rationales for removal jurisdiction.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006); see also id. § 1445 (listing civil actions that are
nonremovable).
145. Dana E. Prescott, Consent Decrees, the Enlightenment, and the “Modern” Social
Contract: A Case Study from Bates, Olmstead, and Maine’s Separation of Powers Doctrine,
59 ME . L. REV . 75, 109 (2007).
146. Ellen Bloomer Mitchell, Improper Use of Removal and Its Disruptive Effect on State
Court Proceedings: A Call To Reform 28 U.S.C. § 1446, 21 ST . MARY ’S L.J. 59, 60 (1989).
147. EDWARD A. PURCELL , JR ., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY : FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA , 1870-1958, at 127 (1992).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c); David D. Siegel, Annotation, Commentary on 1988 and 1990
Revisions of Section 1441, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 2006).
149. FED . R. CIV . P. 1.
150. DEBORAH STONE , POLICY PARADOX : THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 61 (rev.
ed. 2002).
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A. Removal Based on Diversity Jurisdiction
Defendants expect to receive a more favorable outcome in federal
court for several reasons, all of which are directly correlated with
the rationale for removal jurisdiction in general. Historically, many
litigants believed that state courts favored local plaintiffs in
diversity suits.151 This local prejudice prevented nonresident parties
in state courts from receiving a “fair and impartial forum in which
to try their claims or defenses.”152 The fear of local prejudice was
not limited to cases involving private citizen defendants: “Most
scholars would surely agree that at various times there was prejudice, and sometimes open hostility, toward foreign [out-of-state]
corporations in many states.”153
Despite the prominent historical role of local prejudice in the
rationale for allowing the removal of diversity cases, one American
Law Institute study proposed that removal based solely on diversity
jurisdiction be limited exclusively to cases between diverse citizens
in which there is an actual likelihood of prejudice to the out-of-state
defendant as a stranger in the state court.154 Nevertheless, due to
the pervasive trepidation regarding the mere possibility of unfair
treatment, removal premised on diversity jurisdiction continues
to protect nonresident defendants by providing them a mighty

151. See Ry. Co. v. Whitton’s Adm’r, 80 U.S. 270, 289 (1871) (“[Diversity jurisdiction] had
its existence in the impression, that State attachments and State prejudices might affect
injuriously the regular administration of justice in the State courts.”); PURCELL , supra note
147, at 127-28.
152. PURCELL , supra note 147, at 128; see also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing local bias); Hanrick v. Hanrick, 153 U.S. 192,
198 (1894) (“The whole object of allowing a defendant to remove a suit or controversy into the
Circuit Court of the United States is to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining any advantage
against him by reason of prejudice or local influence.”); Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of
Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM .
U. L. REV . 369, 372 (1992) (“Diversity jurisdiction is generally thought to reflect a concern
for out-of-state commercial litigants’ fears of local-court bias.”).
153. PURCELL , supra note 147, at 128; see also Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. 595, 599 (1856)
(discussing the constitutional right to an unbiased forum). Not all of the Founding Fathers
believed that diversity jurisdiction was necessary. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis
of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV . L. REV . 483, 487-92 (1928) (discussing the Founders’
concerns about diversity jurisdiction).
154. AM . LAW INST ., supra note 140, at 2.
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procedural privilege.155 Altogether, removal gives a defendant the
exceptional opportunity to eliminate the anticipated “home-court
advantage” of the plaintiff in diversity actions.156
B. Removal Based on Federal Question Jurisdiction
Apprehension regarding state courts also surfaces in federal
question cases, although for different reasons. Many of America’s
Founders doubted the ability—and desire—of state court judges to
faithfully and competently enforce federal laws.157 Consequently, an
“original purpose of removal jurisdiction in federal question cases
was to ensure that the tribunal better informed on questions of
federal law would adjudicate the matter.”158 Any mistrust was not
restricted to the Founding Era, however, as the Civil War exacerbated suspicion towards state courts by creating “widespread
concern, particularly in Congress, that state courts in the South
could not be trusted to protect the rights of the newly freed
slaves.”159 With the expansion of substantive due process in the
mid-twentieth century, state judicial systems shouldered an
increased burden with respect to protecting individual rights,

155. PURCELL , supra note 147, at 147. Commentators have argued that local bias is no
longer a significant threat to out-of-state litigants in state courts. FED . COURTS STUDY
COMM ., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 40 (1990). To the contrary,
however, Congress recently enacted the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act, which dramatically
lowered the standard for removal in class action lawsuits, to protect nonresident defendants
from local prejudice. See MOORE ET AL ., supra note 13, § 107.03.
156. Rothstein, supra note 22, at 184-85.
157. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
36 UCLA L. REV . 233, 239 (1988). Several of America’s most influential early statesmen
expressed the fear that state courts held a distinct agenda from the federal judiciary. James
Madison once stated, “Confidence cannot be put in the State Tribunals as guardians of the
national authority and interests.” Id. (quoting MAX FARRAND , THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION 124 (1966)). Similarly, Daniel Webster once argued before the Supreme Court
that the “[C]onstitution itself supposes that [state judicial systems] may not always be
worthy of confidence, where the rights and interests of the national government are drawn
into question.” Id. at 240 (quoting Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 81 (1824)).
158. MOORE ET AL ., supra note 13, § 107.03.
159. Chemerinsky, supra note 157, at 240-43; see also PURCELL , supra note 147, at 128-37;
Miller, supra note 152, at 373 (“Fears that courts in the Southern States would refuse to
enforce federally created rights after the Civil War prompted the empowerment of the federal
courts.”).
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leading to further concern regarding state courts.160 Some even
argue, moreover, that generally speaking, a conservative-leaning
Supreme Court’s preference toward state courts is tacitly grounded
in the assumption that federal courts are more likely to act as a
countermajoritarian body than state courts. Thus, it is hypothesized, leaving constitutional questions to state courts rather than
to federal courts might result in fewer countermajoritarian judicial
decisions.161
In addition to the fear that state courts might pursue their own
agendas and disregard the national interest, removal of federal
question cases exists because federal judges are expected to be more
skilled than state judges at deciding federal legal issues: “The
entire basis for federal ‘arising under’ jurisdiction ... is the idea that
forum matters. Federal courts are seen as experts in federal law
and thus better than state courts in interpreting federal law with
accuracy, uniformity, and appropriate sensitivity to federal interests.”162 Consequently, a plaintiff who initially chooses the federal
forum must believe that the federal court will be more receptive to
his federal claim, and a defendant seeking to remove a case when
the plaintiff chooses the state forum employs the same reasoning.163
C. Practical Reasons To Remove a Case
Removal is a strategic litigation decision. Shifting the dispute to
federal court provides defendants with a different environment in
which to litigate their cases. For example, according to one commentator, there are several practical and institutional reasons why
a defendant may attempt to remove a case, including closer judicial
supervision and management of the case, differences in jury demographics, size, and unanimity requirements, different evidentiary
rules and rules regarding awarding attorneys’ fees, and the opportunity to force the plaintiff into a forum he attempted to avoid.164
160. Chemerinsky, supra note 157, at 240; Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV .
L. REV . 1105, 1118-20 (1977).
161. Neuborne, supra note 160, at 1131.
162. Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA . L. REV . 1, 50-51 (2011)
(citations omitted).
163. See Hartnett, supra note 12, at 1173-74.
164. Fousekis & Brelsford, supra note 16, at 39; see also Mitchell, supra note 146, at 60;
Rothstein, supra note 22, at 184 (“Removal may counterbalance the inherent advantages that
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Moreover, the defendant may be more familiar with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure than state procedural rules, or the federal
forum may offer a speedier adjudicative time frame.165 The savvy—
or ruthless, depending on one’s perspective—defendant might also
remove the claim simply because federal court litigation is often
appreciably more expensive than state court litigation.166
Some attorneys also express a preference for federal judges over
state judges.167 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who served as both
a state and federal judge, has expressed what she believes are the
reasons defendants prefer having their cases heard before federal
judges: federal judges are often better compensated, and their
positions are more prestigious; the life tenure of federal judges
insulates them from the majoritarian pressure that democratically
elected officials encounter; and federal judges are more amenable
to the defendant’s position in constitutional rights lawsuits.168
Justice O’Connor concludes, however, that the “allegations concerning relative competency and judicial mindset are essentially
subjective impressions not subject to confirmation in fact.”169 To
reach this conclusion, she notes that higher pay does not equal
higher quality, especially when many federal judges are appointed
from the state bench.170 In addition, many states embrace systems
that insulate their judges from populace pressures, such as
appointing the judges or giving them long tenures.171 Lastly,
although certain federal judges may favor some constitutional
claims more than their state counterparts, no evidence indicates
that federal judges, when considered collectively, have more
sensitivity to every constitutional principle.172

a plaintiff ... may gain in choosing to file in a particular state court.”).
165. MOORE ET AL ., supra note 13, § 107.03.
166. See Hartnett, supra note 12, at 1174.
167. Fousekis & Brelsford, supra note 16, at 39; see also Miller, supra note 152, at 374.
168. Sandra D. O’Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State
Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM . & MARY L. REV . 801, 812-13
(1981).
169. Id. at 813.
170. Id. at 812.
171. Id. at 812-13.
172. Id. at 813.

2011]

ON REM OVAL JURISDICTION

261

D. Empirical Evidence in Support of Removing a Case
Notwithstanding Justice O’Connor’s concessions, significant
empirical evidence supports the decision to remove a case, and in
the world of zero-sum, high-stakes litigation, any increased
probability of victory makes removal an invaluable procedural
weapon for the modern practitioner. Thus, a rational defendant
might remove a case based on his expectation that “[t]he nature of
the forum help[s] determine both the likelihood that plaintiffs
might win and, if they did, the amounts they would receive.”173 To
that point, one study that a pair of law professors conducted
revealed that the “win rate [for plaintiffs] in ... diversity cases
[originally filed in federal court] is 71%, but in removed diversity
cases it is only 34%.”174 Similarly, another study by the same
professors found that the plaintiffs’ win rate was only 36.77 percent
in the 38,306 cases studied that arrived in federal court via removal
from state court.175 The authors concluded that “[p]erhaps the
‘removal effect’ of a lowered win rate results in part from a loss of
forum advantage. Unlike change of venue, ... removal has a fairly
express purpose of changing outcome.”176 In total, “removal seem[s]
to work a seriously negative effect on plaintiffs’ win rate[s].”177
Although the exact causes of this negative effect are debatable, the
empirical evidence clearly supports a defendant’s desire to remove
a case.178
Concerns about removal remain, however, because by providing
a federal forum for lawsuits initiated in a state court, the procedure
deprives a state tribunal of the opportunity to hear a case over
which it had proper jurisdiction.179 This deprivation raises legiti173. PURCELL , supra note 147, at 127 (1992); see also STONE , supra note 150, at 233-34
(discussing the rational decision maker).
174. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 581.
175. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 139, at 1514 n.18.
176. Id.
177. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 606.
178. Id. at 606-07. For further explanation as to why attorneys often prefer the federal
forum, see generally James Duke Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court
Decisions, and a Proposal for a National Court of Appeals—A State Judge’s Solution to a
Continuing Problem, 3 BYU L. REV . 545, 550-53 (1981); Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales
for Federal Question Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Student Rights Litigation,
5 WIS . L. REV . 1315 (1984).
179. MOORE ET AL ., supra note 13, § 107.03.
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mate federalism concerns, but nevertheless, a state is not allowed
to restrict a defendant’s right to removal,180 as the Supreme Court
made clear when it declared, “[Removal jurisdiction] is a question
of the construction of the federal statute on removal, and not the
state statute. The [state]’s procedural provisions cannot control the
privilege of removal granted by the federal statute.”181 The only
exception to this rule is that pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment,
if a state consents to be sued in its own state forum, the case may
not be removed unless the state waives its protection by removing
the case on its own.182 Similarly, removal also respects state judicial
authority by not allowing removal after the state court has issued
a final judgment on the matter.183 The federalism concern is one
reason that courts strictly construe removal statutes. This interpretive approach is influential in resolving the current circuit split
regarding the unanimity rule.184
IV. DISCUSSION : SELECTING THE BETTER CONSENT RULE
The current judicial disagreement regarding how to apply the
unanimity rule creates uncertainty for litigants, adds superfluous
time and expense into the already burdensome litigation process,
and promotes forum shopping. As the Supreme Court has noted,
“[a] single, uniform federal rule ... provide[s] desirable certainty to
both plaintiffs and defendants.”185 This Part endeavors to resolve
the issue by analyzing the two competing consent rules, and ultimately concludes that courts should apply the independent-andunambiguous consent requirement in multi-defendant removal
situations.

180. Id.
181. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 580 (1954).
182. Id.; see also Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 618-24
(2002).
183. See Rosenthal v. Coates, 148 U.S. 142, 147 (1893).
184. See MOORE ET AL ., supra note 13, § 107.05.
185. Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Contra
Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA . L. REV . 1567, 1637-39 (2008) (arguing that
the Supreme Court over-prioritizes uniformity when granting certiorari).
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A. Unanimity, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Formal Service of
Process Requirement
Formal service of process has a vital place in the American legal
system, as the requirement dates back to the English common law
writ of capias ad respondendum.186 Without adequate service of
process—and absent any waiver of service by the defendant—a
court generally may not exercise jurisdiction over the named defendant.187 Consequently, a defendant is not an official party to a suit
until service of process is properly executed, and thus “the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or
substantive rights.”188
The significance of formal service is infused into the removal
process. In order to trigger a defendant’s thirty-day time frame to
file a notice of removal pursuant to § 1446(b), the plaintiff must,
“through service or otherwise,” give the defendant a “copy of the
initial pleading.”189 Plaintiffs, however, abused the “or otherwise”
language of § 1446(b) by utilizing less formal methods of process to
manipulate the removal timing rules, prejudicing the removal
rights of defendants.190 To quash this abuse and informality, the
Supreme Court ruled in Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,
Inc. that a defendant’s thirty days to remove a case do not begin
accruing until formal service of process is made.191 Rejecting the
plaintiff ’s fax of a “courtesy copy of the file-stamped complaint” to
the defendant as insufficient to trigger the removal clock, the Court
held that “[s]ervice of process ... is fundamental to any procedural
imposition on a named defendant.”192 As a result, by adding “or
otherwise” to § 1446(b), Congress only intended to make the statute
flexible enough to meet the diverse state formal process rules while

186. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
187. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
188. Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 351 (1999).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).
190. See Matthew J. Mussalli, Tick, Tock: Rules on the Removal Clock, 19 REV . LITIG . 47,
48 (2000).
191. 526 U.S. at 356.
192. Id. at 348, 350.
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still providing a defendant notice of a suit’s substance before he is
forced to make a removal decision.193
The holding in Murphy Bros. and the necessity of formal, written
notice before a defendant is either haled into court or forced to
choose whether to remove a case supports the independent consent
requirement. In a multi-defendant lawsuit, the vouching rule enables a defendant who files for removal to submit his codefendant to
the federal district court’s power without any formal acknowledgment of that codefendant’s consent. Thus, the federal court can
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to an implied authority: the court
assumes that given the moving defendant’s vouching of consent and
the nonmoving defendant’s lack of resistance, the nonmoving defendant is aware that he is an official party to a lawsuit in federal
court. The nonmoving defendant, however, is not guaranteed such
notice. In effect, the notice requirement that was so fundamental in
Murphy Bros.—and in American constitutional law194 and civil
procedure195 in general—is missing. In any other situation, no court
would base its jurisdictional power on a defendant’s claim that he
verbally informed his codefendant of the suit; such an action is not
an adequate substitute for formal service of process and notice.
A federal court, therefore, should not exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant in a removed action without first explicitly determining
that each defendant to the suit has received notice that the court is
doing so. Notice becomes intertwined with judicial power and, as
such, is an issue of constitutional importance. Without acknowledgment through either the codefendant’s signature on the notice of
removal or an individual written record of consent, the federal court
relies on an implied jurisdictional power over a defendant, which
contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process requirement.196 The independent-and-unambiguous consent interpretation
of the unanimity rule alleviates this concern because there is no
193. Id. at 352-53.
194. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (stating
that notice is a “fundamental requisite” of the Fourteenth Amendment).
195. See FED . R. CIV . P. 4.
196. This situation is problematic because a court might exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant based on implied consent even when the defendant lacks the relationship with
the forum state that the Fourteenth Amendment traditionally requires. See Wendy Collins
Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV . 529, 536-39, 542-44
(1991) (discussing consent and personal jurisdiction).
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need for implied consent to jurisdiction when the defendant has
explicitly both expressed his consent and acknowledged the
removal.
B. Consistency with Removal Policy
One goal of the unanimity rule is to prevent a willing defendant
from dragging an unwilling defendant into federal court.197 This
goal is closely related to a second purpose of the rule: preventing
the splitting of a plaintiff ’s lawsuit.198 Indeed, without the unanimity rule, if one defendant attempts to remove a case but the other is
unwilling, one of two outcomes will result: either the unwilling
defendant will be forced into the federal court, or the unwilling
defendant will be allowed to remain in state court, thereby inefficiently forcing the plaintiff to litigate in separate forums.
The vouching approach, by not requiring individual consent,
inflames the risk of an unwilling defendant being forced into the
federal forum. It allows a defendant to file the notice of removal
while mistakenly or fraudulently vouching for the consent of his
codefendants when the codefendants do not, in fact, consent. If the
court accepts the vouching interpretation of the unanimity rule, the
codefendants are now stuck in federal court unless and until they
move to have the case remanded—assuming there is no jurisdictional flaw that prompts the court to remand the case sua sponte.
The codefendants may decide to forsake such a challenge and
instead proceed in federal court, or they may choose to litigate the
facts and procedural defect on a motion to remand.
Either of these choices is fundamentally unfair to the nonmoving
defendants and counter to the principles of the unanimity rule;
although the defendants may recover costs from the removal
litigation, including attorneys’ fees,199 there is a significant delay
until the case returns to state court.200 Such activity is also harmful
to the state court from which the case was removed.201 To the
contrary, the independent-and-unambiguous consent requirement
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See supra text accompanying note 74.
See supra text accompanying note 73.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006).
See Mitchell, supra note 146, at 106.
Id. at 60.
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reduces these risks by discouraging abuse of the removal procedure—or, at least making abuse more difficult—and by allowing a
defendant to quickly and easily prove that he did not consent by
pointing out the lack of any written consent form. This requirement
thus prevents any prolonged litigation on the matter and ensures
that the improperly removed case is quickly returned to the state
tribunal.
C. The Value of a Clear Rule
There is a compelling “federal interest in uniformity and ... in
having ‘firmly defined, easily applied rules.’”202 True to its name,
the independent-and-unambiguous consent standard emphasizes
clarity and simplicity when applying the unanimity rule’s consent
requirement. But the vouching rule also promotes simplicity: the
court presumes that there is consent, unless a nonmoving defendant states to the contrary. Although straightforward to apply in
theory, in practice the vouching rule fails to promote the fundamental values that a bright-line rule is expected to encompass; instead,
it operates as the removal equivalent of a Rube Goldberg device.
1. A Lesson from Hertz Corp. v. Friend
A recent Supreme Court case illustrates the importance of
adopting an easily applied, clear rule.203 In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, a
2010 case involving a class action lawsuit against Hertz Corporation alleging violations of California’s wage and hours laws, the
Court installed a uniform test for determining a corporation’s
principal place of business pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1),
ending a longstanding judicial debate.204 Emphasizing the importance of certainty in a procedural rule, the Court noted that
although there is value in applying a broad and adaptable test,205
“administrative simplicity is a major virtue in a jurisdictional
202. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270, 275 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting
Chardon v. Fumero Suto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983)); see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct.
1181, 1192-93 (2010). A uniform rule also eliminates one incentive for forum shopping.
203. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192-93; see also Dodson, supra note 162, at 3.
204. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1185-86, 1191-92.
205. Id. at 1192.
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statute.”206 As a result, courts should endeavor to avoid tests that
“complicate a case, eating up time and money as the parties
litigate” issues other than the merits of the dispute.207 Procedural
rules that “produce appeals and reversals [and] encourage gamesmanship” unnecessarily exhaust precious judicial resources.208
Several federal courts adopting the individual consent standard
have also acknowledged the value associated with applying a
bright-line rule, including the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Berrios v. Our Lady of Mercy
Medical Center.209 In addition, in National Waste Associates v. TD
Bank, N.A., the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut noted that “[a]bandoning the bright-line rule ... would
... encourage litigation about matters peripheral to the merits of
lawsuits.”210 Altogether, these cases represent a strong repudiation
of the vouching rule because that standard allows for too much
confusion and ambiguity during the removal process.
2. Lowering Transaction Costs
For all the doubt that the vouching rule adds to the litigation
process, it saves very little time and money. Even the most novice
litigation associate can quickly draft the short and simple notice of
removal. It is unclear why a court allowing one attorney to vouch
for another’s consent feels compelled to excuse counsels from such
a basic procedural task. Certainly the cost-conscious client would
prefer his counsel to draft the removal notice rather than take the
risk of paying that counsel to litigate the consent issue on appeal;
that same client would also prefer not to waste the expensive notice
of removal filing fee on a failed removal effort.211 Admittedly, some
206. Id. at 1193.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. No. 99 Civ. 21 (DLC), 1999 WL 92269, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1999).
210. No. 3:10-CV-289, 2010 WL 1931031, at *6 n.17 (D. Conn. May 12, 2010) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. The filing fee may be as high as $350. See Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/us11000.asp (last visited Sept. 25,
2011). Upon remand, defendants might also have to pay attorneys’ fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)
(2006), but the Supreme Court has abated this possibility by reading an “objectively
reasonable” defense into the statute. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136
(2005).
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cases involve time restraints that prevent counsels from submitting
a notice of removal,212 but it is plausible that even if a defendant
has only twenty-four hours to remove a case due to a late joinder,
an experienced attorney could still draft a proper and timely notice
of removal. Or, even more simply in such a situation, under the
independent-and-unambiguous rule an attorney may just sign a
codefendant’s already prepared notice of removal.213
The balancing between the marginal cost of requiring individual
consent—which, as posited, is relatively low—and the purported
efficiency benefits of the vouching rule is a compelling factor in
resolving this debate.214 On the one hand, the heightened independent consent requirement adds negligible costs and time to the
litigation process while at the same time actually reducing the risk
of later costs and delays arising when the consent issue is litigated
on the motion to remand and perhaps again on appeal. On the other
hand, the vouching rule creates uncertainty and an increased
likelihood of future litigation while providing minimal efficiency
benefits. Both perspectives combine to make the independent-andunambiguous consent rule the obvious choice.
Furthermore, the inherent flexibility of the vouching rule, which
is a result of allowing parties to consent to removal via a broader
array of methods than the independent consent requirement might
allow, contravenes the general nature of the removal statutes.
These statutes establish precise standards for removing a case,
including specific jurisdictional and timing requirements. Removal
is, in effect, more akin to a well-regulated procedural process than
a jurisdictional analysis, such as determining in personam jurisdiction. Thus, by requiring specificity and promoting lucidity, the
independent consent requirement fits comfortably within the highly
regulated removal procedure. There is also no benefit to keeping the
consent requirement broad or vague for the sake of future adaptability or to stay in line with the policy reasons for removal, as the

212. Such a problem arises particularly when courts apply the first-served defendant rule.
See supra Part I.B.2.
213. See Spillers v. Tillman, 959 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D. Miss. 1997). In federal courts,
which frequently rely on electronic submissions, an electronic signature should be adequate.
214. See STONE , supra note 150, at 235-36 (defining cost-benefit balancing).
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removal process should be quick, simple, and certain.215 The
vouching rule only adds superfluous doubt to the litigation process.
If all courts adopt the individual consent requirement, however,
the heightened standard might make it more difficult for defendants to gain access to the federal judicial system. Because one of
the central purposes of removal jurisdiction is to grant defendants
the opportunity to litigate in federal court, this is a legitimate policy
concern.216 Presumably, however, defendants who currently litigate
in a jurisdiction that applies the vouching rule will quickly adjust
their behavior to conform to the independent-and-unambiguous
removal standard, and in the long run, all defendants will reap the
efficiency benefits that the rule promotes.
D. Strict Constructionist Interpretation of Removal Rules
Courts should strictly construe removal statutes in favor of
limiting the right to removal jurisdiction.217 In regard to the consent
requirement during the removal of multi-defendant lawsuits, a
strict interpretation of the unanimity rule favors the independentand-unambiguous approach.218 This approach heightens the standard for removal, making removal both less likely and more difficult. It also better protects the plaintiff ’s forum choice: when there
is doubt in the removal procedure, which occurs when one defendant vouches for the other’s consent rather than each defendant
individually expressing consent, an approach that creates exceptions for defendants and lowers the requirements for removal
215. The removal procedure is distinct from removal jurisdiction. Although there is value
in keeping removal jurisdiction rules vague and adaptable, that is less true for the step-bystep process by which one accesses that jurisdiction. Cf. Dodson, supra note 162, at 53
(“[Uncertainty] can provide opportunities for courts to better implement and accommodate
the underlying policies in given circumstances. These benefits are particularly true for the
area of jurisdiction, in which the courts have a strong claim to expertise.”).
216. See supra Part III.A-B.
217. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); In re Hot-Hed
Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (“As the effect of removal is to deprive the state court
of an action properly before it, removal raises significant federalism concerns. The removal
statute is therefore to be strictly construed and any doubt as to the propriety of removal
should be resolved in favor of remand.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
218. Dichiara v. RDM Techs., No. 08-11411-NMG, 2009 WL 1351640, at *5 (D. Mass. Jan.
13, 2009) (holding that strict constructionism requires application of the independent consent
rule).
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facilitates a defendant’s ability to disrupt the plaintiff ’s original
decision to litigate in state court. The individual consent requirement is therefore more consistent with the proper interpretation of
removal statutes in general.
E. The Proper Interpretation of Rule 11
Just as Rule 11 plays a prominent role in decisions by federal
courts applying the vouching rule, it serves an equally important
function in the independent-and-unambiguous consent jurisdictions. Given the central presence of Rule 11 in the text of § 1446(a),
it is not surprising that an interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure’s sanctions provision is influential in the ultimate
decisions of these courts. For example, in Creekmore v. Food Lion,
Inc., a torts case in which the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia adopted the independent consent requirement, the court firmly stated, “Rule 11 does not authorize one
party to make representations or file pleadings on behalf of another.”219 Whereas other courts specifically held that Rule 11 not
only allows but also buttresses the ability of one defendant to vouch
for another defendant’s consent, the court in Creekmore unequivocally held that Rule 11 requires each defendant to “file their own
signed pleadings.”220 In addition, the court noted, “One of the primary reasons that parties may have separate counsel is to present
independently their position to the court.”221 Similarly, a court also
adopted this interpretation of Rule 11 in National Waste Associates
v. TD Bank, N.A., a case in which the Connecticut federal district
court declared, “Nowhere does [Rule 11] ... authorize one defendant
to sign solely on behalf of all other defendants, based on a representation of their consent.”222

219. 797 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D. Va. 1992).
220. Id. Creekmore was decided before the 1993 amendments to Rule 11. However,
according to the advisory committee’s note on the 1993 amendments, the intent of Rule 11(a),
the relevant section in Creekmore, was unchanged by the amendments. FED . R. CIV . P. 11
advisory committee’s note.
221. Creekmore, 797 F. Supp. at 509 n.9.
222. Nat’l Waste Assocs. v. TD Bank, N.A., No. 3:10-CV-289, 2010 WL 1931031, at *6 (D.
Conn. May 12, 2010).
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1. The Need for Individually Signed Representations to the
Court
Section 1446(a) requires a defendant to “file” a notice of removal,
and Rule 11 regulates written representations to the courts.223
Nothing in Rule 11 or its accompanying advisory committee notes
suggests an exception to the signed pleadings requirement.224
Moreover, the advisory note to the 1993 amendments to Rule 11
explicitly cautions against submitting a representation to the court
without the signatures of the attorneys of record: “Unsigned papers
... are to be stricken if the omission of the signature is not corrected
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney.”225
Additionally, the official commentary to Rule 11 states that “[t]he
obligations imposed under [Rule 11] ... obviously require that a
pleading, written motion, or other paper be read before it is filed or
submitted to the court.”226 If a court allows one defendant to vouch
for another defendant’s consent, the attorneys who did not sign the
notice of removal are submitting a written representation to the
court without reviewing the document with the requisite level of
attention and care. To the contrary, the individual written consent
requirement does not encounter this problem; the attorney for each
defendant, by being required to sign the notice of removal, has the
opportunity—and thus the duty—to diligently review the notice
before filing it.
Furthermore, the 1993 advisory committee note to Rule 11 adds,
“[Rule 11] retains the principle that attorneys ... have an obligation
to the court to refrain from conduct that frustrates the aims of
Rule 1.”227 However, those aims, which include promoting the efficient and just adjudication of cases,228 are disrupted when a court
accepts an interpretation of Rule 11 that allows an attorney to
vouch for the consent of another defendant. That interpretation
only leads to confusion, more litigation, and the heightened possi-

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2006); FED . R. CIV . P. 11(a)-(b).
See FED . R. CIV . P. 11 advisory committee’s note.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See FED . R. CIV . P. 1.
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bility of injustice.229 But, if courts correctly apply Rule 11 as requiring each attorney’s individually signed, written consent, they
will promote the goals of Rule 1, reduce litigation time and costs,
and better thwart the possibility of injustice.
2. How Vouching May Circumvent Rule 11
One example clearly illustrates how the vouching rule’s interpretation of Rule 11 can lead to undesirable results. Plaintiff, a
resident of Virginia, sues Defendant A, a resident of Maine, and
Defendant B, a resident of Virginia. The suit is filed in Virginia
state court, an appropriate forum for the claim. The amount in
controversy is $500,000, and there is no federal question at issue.
Due to the forum-defendant rule, this suit appears unremovable.
However, further assume that Defendants A and B have never met.
Defendant A honestly and reasonably believes that, based on
limited paperwork he has regarding the lawsuit, Defendant B is
actually a resident of Maryland, not Virginia. Suddenly, Defendant
A believes that the forum-defendant prohibition does not apply. He
files his notice of removal, which is based on diversity jurisdiction,
and vouches in it that Defendant B consents. In the notice,
Defendant A states in good faith that Defendant B is a resident of
Maryland.
If the Virginia federal district court interprets the unanimity
rule as only requiring vouching for the other defendant’s consent,
the case now appears to be properly removed. Defendant B, by not
having to actually sign any statement filed with the court, avoids
having to represent himself as a resident of Virginia.230 The burden
is thus shifted to Plaintiff to discover that fact and to seek remand.
The protections Rule 11 is meant to offer, many of which are
significant reasons in support of the vouching rule, are in fact
skirted under the rule.231 Moreover, the attorney for Defendant B
may not be subject to Rule 11 sanctions because he never actually
229. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 74 (discussing the risk of an unwilling
defendant being dragged into federal court).
230. The lack of a signature, which is essential to binding an attorney under Rule 11, is
responsible for this loophole.
231. See supra Part II.A (stating the role of Rule 11 in decisions adopting the vouching
rule).
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filed anything with the court. As such, not only do the language and
purpose of Rule 11 not support the vouching method, and not only
does Rule 11 on numerous occasions express principles that the
vouching rule directly frustrates, but vouching may also allow
avoidance of Rule 11 altogether.
CONCLUSION
Removal jurisdiction is a unique and powerful procedural weapon
for many litigators. The plaintiff, as master of the complaint,
initially receives great leeway to control the forum in which the case
will be litigated. But removal allows the defendant to frustrate the
plaintiff ’s forum choice by quickly whisking away the lawsuit to a
federal court with the expectation that being in the federal forum
will lead to a more favorable outcome. Although not a constitutionally enumerated right, removal’s long history—which dates back to
the earliest judiciary acts—indicates its importance in American
litigation. Today, the unanimity rule exists among removal’s
numerous complex procedural requirements. As a common law
creation, however, the unanimity rule has yet to be statutorily
codified. The requirement has, nevertheless, steadfastly remained
an important aspect of the removal process, and it continues to
operate as one of the many possible roadblocks to a defendant’s
successful removal.
Without explicit congressional or Supreme Court guidance regarding how to interpret the unanimous consent requirement,
federal courts across the country have been charged with the task
of establishing the rule’s exact procedural application. Importantly,
that responsibility has included determining how each defendant
must express consent to the removal. As discussed in Part II, federal courts have reached divergent interpretations of the unanimous consent requirement. Many federal courts have applied a
lenient test that only requires the defendant who files the notice of
removal to state that the other joined defendants have consented to
the removal. Bound by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the
moving defendant is trusted to accurately vouch for the unanimous
consent of his codefendants. Several other federal courts have taken
a different approach, however. These courts require what they
describe as independent and unambiguous consent. This interpreta-
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tion prohibits vouching and instead compels each defendant to
individually express written consent to the court.
Although statutory language and legitimate policy rationales
support each of these requirements, the independent-and-unambiguous consent rule more acutely promotes those policy goals and is
more consistent with the language of the removal statutes. This
clear and simple consent rule promotes certainty, and, consequently, it reduces litigation time and costs. The interpretation also
aligns with the language and purpose of Rule 11. Finally, the
independent consent requirement ensures that all nonmoving
defendants are afforded proper notice before being haled into
federal court, as due process requires. If every federal court adopts
the independent-and-unambiguous consent requirement, all parties
to a lawsuit—both plaintiffs and defendants—will immediately
benefit from the efficiency and simplicity of the rule.
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